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This paper conducts a comprehensive study of patent citations in patents granted to the new 
economy  firms  in  Belgium  by  the  US  and  the  EU  Patent  Offices  using  a  general  qualitative 
response variable analysis, allowing for asymmetries in size and other characteristics. The studied 
citation data provide evidence of very industry-specific inter-, intra-firm and inter-, intra-industry 
knowledge  spillovers. No general  high-tech or new economy knowledge spillovers pattern was 
observed in the data. Therefore, we advocate for a regulator to use the industry-specific natural market 
incentives in combination with particular regulatory measures to achieve the desired effects in promoting 




JEL Classification: C25, D21, O31, O34 
Keywords:  Knowledge Spillovers, R&D, Patent Citation, Limited Dependent Variable Regression 
                                                            
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿!￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿%%￿￿￿￿&￿
’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿*+,￿￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ 0 ￿￿
12 2 2 ￿*￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%( ￿￿￿￿3 ￿40 1+5 2 6 0 +112 +7/ 78 ￿￿￿￿# 3 ￿40 1+5 2 6 0 +112 +72 19 ￿￿￿%￿￿￿3 ￿: ￿￿￿￿￿&.￿￿￿%￿￿￿@￿￿&￿￿&" ￿￿  2 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Virtually every industrial activity utilizes knowledge and technology.  But the intensity of such 
utilization  varies  from  industry  to  industry,  which  in  many  cases  plays  a  decisive  role  in  the 
country’s economic performance.  Recently, researchers in economics started to use the term “new 
economy”  to  characterize  the  developments  leading  to  the  formation  of  the  business  practices 
which, according to Lünnemann (2001), are: i) innovative; ii) use new cutting edge techniques and 
technologies; iii) use experimental know-how; iv) use investors’ money to finance R&D.
1 
The new economy firms more heavily rely on their intangible assets as a source of their market 
value and competitive position.  Therefore, the flow of the knowledge among such firms is not only 
a process of pure information sharing, but also contributes to the increase/decrease of their market 
value, competitive and economic efficiency.  In a contemporary knowledge and technology driven 
economy, the role of knowledge exchange and dissemination is often as important as, for example, 
the role of direct investment.   
Firstly, such spillovers allow a better penetration and diffusion of innovation among economic 
agents increasing their competitiveness (through lower costs of new technologies).  Secondly, they 
stimulate cooperation in R&D by creating additional incentives for innovators to try to internalize 
knowledge flows and pool the resources in joint research efforts.  Both of these types of effects 
eventually result in faster technological progress and economic growth in the country.   
Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) classify knowledge spillovers as vertical or horizontal.  Horizontal 
spillovers occur between competitors in the same industry, and vertical spillovers flow between 
firms in different industries. Both these types of spillovers are directly linked to three factors of 
economic growth (Glaeser et al. (1992)): specialization, competition and diversity. Specialization is 
characterized  by  a  higher  intensity  of  intra-industry  knowledge  spillovers,  while  diversity  goes 
together with more extensive inter-industry knowledge exchange.  Subsequently, the competition 
factor affects the degree of inter-firm innovation flows. 
Horizontal spillovers improve competitiveness of firms in a particular industry, making the 
whole industrial sector of the country more competitive on international level.  Vertical spillovers 
are based on the information exchange between agents with different perspectives (Carlino (2001)).  
This exchange leads to development of the new ideas in a way, different from that of the horizontal 
spillovers. 
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In this context we put forward a research question.  Which type (if any) of knowledge spillovers 
prevails in the new economy firms in Belgium?  How do they exchange and use each other’s 
innovative knowledge?  Which strategic and regulatory implications can be drawn from the answers 
on these questions? 
1.1.  Knowledge Spillovers: the Patent “Trail” 
The presented research aims at tracking down knowledge spillovers in the new economy firms 
in Belgium by following one of the most effective trails of innovation: patenting and patent citation.  
We argue for the usage of patent citations to track knowledge transfers based on the observation 
that the decision to patent is a ‘strategic decision’ (Jaffe et al. (1993)).  If the firm decides to apply 
for a patent, it recognizes the potential value of the invention.  This does not mean that not patented 
knowledge is worthless, but we should advocate that the patented knowledge is the one most likely 
to be commercialized.  Whereas the patent was before a mere legal document, the patent turned 
nowadays into a  tool of strategic competitive  behavior.   Firms build their intellectual property 
portfolios, trade patents, sell licenses, and create patent pools with other firms.  In some industries 
patents have a crucial strategic importance.  In the pharmaceutical industry it is not usually enough 
to  patent  only  one  molecular  structure  for  the  efficient  protection  of  the  invention.    A  small 
molecular variation of the same active component must also be patented.  Thus, such firms must 
apply for numerous patents to protect their innovative effort and investment. 
Another strategic patenting move implies creating the patent family, which is a set of patents 
issued by different patent offices in different countries, but protecting the same invention.  For 
example, in 1995, there were about 32 000 patent families in the OECD area.  The United States 
accounted  for  about  35%,  followed  by  the  European  Union  (32%)  and  Japan  (27%)  (OECD, 
(2001)).  Plasmans et al. (1998) and (1999) advocate that the entrepreneurial innovative behavior 
can be explained reasonably well by the entrepreneur’s patenting behavior.  They use the average 
propensity to patent (the number of patents per million constant PPP dollars of R&D expenditures) 
as a crude measure for the absence of knowledge spillovers and apply it to panel data for core EU 
countries and different industries (over the sample period 1989-1995).  
In their contribution to the publication of The National Innovation System of Belgium, Capron 
and Cincera (2000) studied the technological performance of Belgian companies using patent and 
scientific-publication information as output indicators of technological and innovation activity from 
1980 to 1996.  This study aimed to determine the areas of comparative technological advantage and 
the regional distribution of innovative efforts in Belgium. 
Advantages  and  disadvantages  of  using  patent  citation  data  are  extensively  discussed  by 
Griliches (1990) and Jaffe et al. (1993).  Patent citations are linked to the patenting procedure itself.  
They capture only the knowledge flows, which occur between patented ‘pieces’ of innovation, thus   4 
underestimating the actual extent of knowledge spillovers.  Other means of knowledge transfer are 
not  captured  by  patent  citations.    These  means  are:  purchase  of  capital  goods  with  embodied 
technologies, employment of engineers and other creative staff from other firms and institutions, 
voluntary knowledge exchange at conferences and in scientific publications, etc. (see also Dumont 
and Tsakanikas (2001)).  Though we should admit the importance of other non-patent-citation ways 
of knowledge exchange, it is necessary to point out that only the patent citation is to a large extent 
finalized as a representation of such exchange.  The knowledge acquired informally or indirectly is 
likely to become an object of a dispute with other economic agents.  Such disputes are common in 
business practice and they add a substantial amount of disturbance in data, when it is used for the 
analysis  of  innovative information  exchange.   Patent information  is  better  protected from  such 
disruption, because it clearly indicates the ownership over a particular piece of knowledge, which is 
protected by law.  Patent disputes are also possible, but these are usually resolved quickly by the 
authoritative institutions
2. 
An  extensive  study  of  Verspagen  (1997)  analyses  patent  citation  data  in  relation  to  the 
productivity growth analysis for a cross-country, cross-sectional sample.  He advocates that patent 
citations provide a measure for knowledge spillovers, which is different from other conventional 
measures.  In addition, Verspagen (1999) investigated the impact of large Dutch companies on 
domestic  knowledge  diffusion  in  the  Netherlands  by  studying  patent-to-patent  citation  data, 
provided by the EPO.  This study employed a network analysis to analyze the place of Dutch 
multinationals  in  the  domestic  technology  infrastructure.  Another  Dutch  study  investigated  the 
citations to Dutch-authored research papers on granted USPTO patents (Tijssen (2001)) to figure 
out the impact of the Dutch-authored innovations on other patented knowledge. 
Our study derives itself from the previous investigations of knowledge spillovers in Belgium 
(see Plasmans and Lukach (2001) and (2002)).  The former study presented a ‘snap-shot’ picture of 
knowledge  flows  through  the  mechanism  of  patent  citations  in  all  the  Belgian  firms’  patent 
applications to the EPO, and the granted applications submitted to the USPTO in 1997.  In the latter 
paper we conducted a comparative analysis of the data and tested the methodology for qualitative 
response variable analysis  (probit, logit and Weibull modeling), which was based on the recent 
research of Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) who constructed a probit-type binary choice model of 
knowledge flows using patent citations.  
1.2.  Knowledge, Spillovers, Competition and Economic Growth: the Theory 
According to the definition given by De Bondt (1996), the concept of a ‘knowledge spillover’ is 
specified as an ‘involuntary leakage or voluntary exchange’ of technological knowledge.  Another 
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definition, presented in Nieuwenhuijsen and van Stel (2000), describes knowledge spillovers as the 
situation,  in  which  one  economic agent  benefits  from  R&D  efforts  of  another economic  agent 
without any tangible remuneration.  These two definitions are given on the firm level and depending 
on the particular setup can describe both horizontal and vertical spillovers. 
Gandal and Scotchmer (1993) advocate that it is more efficient to delegate research efforts to 
the agent with the highest ability by means of a Research Joint Venture (RJV) and this will lead to 
better private and social results.  In the framework of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), the study 
of Lukach and Plasmans (2000) investigated the optimal R&D and production strategies of firms, 
which have different capabilities in research and production. 
The work of Arrow (1962) points out that the competitive behavior of firms in the economy 
yields  a  smaller  amount  of  aggregate  investment  compared  to  the  socially  desirable  one.    By 
stimulating  firms  to  cooperate  in  R&D,  the  social  planner  shifts  the  mode  of  their  R&D  and 
production behavior from a competitive to a less competitive position with a higher value of the 
welfare function.  In order to stimulate R&D cooperation among innovative firms, the regulator has 
a  number  of  tools  to  achieve  the  desired  effect.    Such  tools  can  be  direct  and  tax  subsidies, 
government’s R&D investment and expenditures policies.  
For example, the profit maximizing firms in industries with weak knowledge spillovers tend to 
compete in R&D, rather than to cooperate.  Thus, if the regulator wants to induce R&D cooperation, 
it should come up with some tangible way to stimulate these firms’ cooperation.  On the other hand, 
in  conditions  with  strong  knowledge  spillovers  market  forces  provide  a  certain  stimulus  for 
companies to cooperate in research and thus the regulator can save resources by letting ‘the nature 
doing its job’.  If we consider the regulator’s task in stimulating the economic growth by inducing 
R&D  cooperation,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  correct  assessment  of  the  knowledge  spillovers’ 
environment can be one of the important elements for the success of such regulating policy. 
1.3.  Innovation in the New Economy: Patenting in the High-Technology Manufacturing 
Industries` 
The firms in almost every industry utilize knowledge and technology to a certain degree.  But 
there are industries, where such usage is more intensive in comparison to the others.  In the Science, 
Technology  and  Industry  Scoreboard  2001,  the  OECD  researchers  provide  a  list  of  industries, 
which are considered as high-technology and medium-high-technology industries (OECD (2001)): 
￿￿High-technology  (New Economy) industries: Aircraft and spacecraft, Pharmaceuticals, 
Office,  accounting  and  computing  machinery,  Radio,  television  and  communications 
equipment, Medical, precision and optical instruments, Electrical machinery and apparatus, 
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Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals, Railroad 
equipment and transport equipment, Machinery and equipment. 
We augment this list by the new-economy’s services industries (Lünnemann (2001)): 
￿￿New Economy services industries: Information technology consulting, Information and 
communication services, New financial services, Research and Development services. 
In this paper we analyze the patent citation patterns exhibited by the Belgian firms, operating in 
the  new  economy  manufacturing  and  services  industries,  based  on  the  given  OECD  list.    We 
analyze patenting data from two major sources: the EPO and the USPTO.  Our aim is to draw a 
picture of the ‘patent-driven’ knowledge spillovers in the new economy industries in Belgium.  In 
particular, we study the patents granted to the high-tech firms in period from 1996 to 2000. 
The raw dataset is presented by the patent citations indicated in the patents granted by the EPO 
or the USPTO to corporate applicants in Belgium, operating in the high-tech manufacturing and the 
new-economy’s services industries.  Among those, we select all citations, corresponding to the 
applicants,  which  are  identifiable  in  the  BelFirst  database  (compiled  by  the  National  Bank  of 
Belgium (NBB) and Bureau Van Dijk).  This allows us to adjust the ownership of patents belonging 
to the firms, which are involved in shareholder-subsidiary relationships. 
Our primary source of information lies in a ‘patent citation pair’.  This kind of data supplies a 
good  opportunity  to  study  knowledge  flows,  indicated  by  the  citation  references  in  the  patent 
application.  In the final modeling stage we use all patent citation pairs, produced by the patents, 
granted to the new economy firms in Belgium. We have obtained additional advantage by using the 
data from two different patent offices simultaneously.  In the large majority of previous studies only 
one source was used and only one particular part of citations was studied.  If the data were derived 
from the EPO database, then the sole citations studied were (mainly) the citations where one EPO 
patent cites another EPO patent (similarly with USPTO).  In our case we use not only citations 
between patents issued by one patent office, but also the citations when the patent issued by the 
EPO cites the patent issued by the USPTO and vice versa. 
In our primary dataset each line represents a single patent citation accompanied by several 
descriptive  characteristics,  which  are:  the  patent  number,  the  applicant’s  name,  the  applicant’s 
country,  the  year  in  which  the  patent  was  granted,  and  the  patent’s  class  according  to  the 
International Patent Classification (IPC).  In addition to that, we use the IPC-ISIC (ISIC – the 
International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities of the United Nations) 
concordance table compiled by Verspagen et al. (1994) to transform the somewhat ambiguous IPC 
classes  into  more  business-oriented  groups  indicated  in  the  ISIC  (compatible  with  the  familiar 
NACE classification).  We also mark a number of ISIC codes by their correspondence to the OECD   7 
list of the high-tech and medium-high-tech industries.  In this way we can determine the innovations 
and the knowledge transfers in the high-tech industrial sectors. 
 
2.  PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
The source dataset is a pooled sample of all patents granted by the EPO and the USPTO to 85 
new economy firms in Belgium (and that are not directly transferred to a foreign headquarter) 
during the period between 1996 and 2000.  It contains 2013 patents (807 from the EPO and 1206 
from the USPTO), which produce 8404 initial patent-to-patent citations (1827 originating from the 
EPO patents, and 6577 from the USPTO).  
Table 1. Geographic distribution of patent citations in 1996-2000 patents granted by 
the EPO and USPTO to Belgium’s new economy firms. 
  Country  USPTO  EPO  Total 
1  United States of America  38.84%  33.37%  37.42% 
2  Japan  23.06%  22.11%  22.82% 
3  Belgium  20.19%  24.77%  21.37% 
4  Germany  5.65%  6.01%  5.74% 
5  Great Britain  3.45%  3.81%  3.54% 
6  France  2.69%  3.00%  2.77% 
7  Switzerland  1.26%  0.89%  1.16% 
8  Italy  0.86%  1.44%  1.01% 
9  The Netherlands  0.84%  1.33%  0.97% 
10  Canada  0.57%  1.10%  0.71% 
  Other  2.58%  2.17%  2.48% 
Table 1 lists the ten countries, from which most cited patents originate (97.52% of the total 
number of citations).  According to the data from both patent offices, the USA patents are the ones 
cited the most.  The second and third places are held by Japan and Belgium, although in the EPO 
patents the Belgian citations occur more often than the Japanese, and in the USPTO sample it is just 
the opposite.  Rationally, we would have expected that Belgian patents will be the mostly cited, 
driven by the argument that intra-firm and intra-country citations are more likely to occur than the 
more distant ones (see Jaffe & Trajtenberg (1998)).  Patents from the United States are the most 
frequently cited by Belgian companies.  The knowledge spillovers from Japan are also quite strong.  
The other positions are occupied by the countries of the European Union. Thus, we conclude that 
the  geographic  proximity  assumption  is  not  strongly  supported  by  the  collected  information: 
domestic patents are not the most frequently cited; although citing domestically cannot be rejected 
as well, because we observe the Belgian patents in the top part of the list, and the countries from the 
European continent occupying seven out of top ten positions in the most cited list. 
We analyze the 20 new economy firms in Belgium, which account for the vast majority of the 
granted patents in 1996-2000 and the patent citations generated.  Table 2 contains percentages of 
patents granted to these companies.  Table 3 presents the list of the new economy firms with the 
highest number of patent citations indicated in patents granted by the EPO and the USPTO during   8 
the period from 1996 to 2000.  In this table we see that the top 20 companies (or 24% of the all new 
economy firms in our dataset) account for more than 96% of the patent citations. 
Table 2.  Percentage of patents granted to selected high-tech firms in Belgium by the 
EPO and the USPTO and in total during the period 1996-2000. 
    USPTO  EPO  Total 
1  Agfa-Gevaert  51.66%  48.82%  50.52% 
2  Solvay  12.35%  15.37%  13.56% 
3  Janssen Pharmaceutica  10.45%  4.46%  8.05% 
4  Esselte  3.48%  3.72%  3.58% 
5  AtsFina Research  3.23%  4.21%  3.63% 
6  Heraeus Electro-Nite International  2.74%  2.60%  2.68% 
7  Aventis Crop Science  3.65%  0.50%  2.38% 
8  Innogenetics  2.32%  1.12%  1.84% 
9  Smithkline Beecham Biologicals  1.24%  1.36%  1.29% 
10  U.C.B.  1.33%  1.86%  1.54% 
11  Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products  1.16%  0.00%  0.70% 
12  Staar  1.08%  0.37%  0.79% 
13  Sofitech  0.00%  3.10%  1.24% 
14  International Brachytherapy  0.17%  0.00%  0.10% 
15  Alcatel Bell  0.08%  2.73%  1.14% 
16  Recticel  0.25%  0.50%  0.35% 
17  Norton Performance Plastics  0.17%  0.00%  0.10% 
18  Siemens  0.25%  0.87%  0.50% 
19  Magotteaux International  0.50%  0.12%  0.35% 
20  Sigma  0.08%  0.12%  0.10% 
  Other  3.81%  8.18%  5.56% 
 
Table 3.  Percentage of patent citations generated in the patents granted to selected 
firms in Belgium by the EPO and the USPTO and in total in 1996-2000. 
    USPTO  EPO  Total 
1  Agfa-Gevaert  48.49%  49.53%  48.71% 
2  Solvay  13.29%  13.74%  13.39% 
3  Janssen Pharmaceutica  7.74%  5.04%  7.15% 
4  Esselte  6.67%  4.82%  6.27% 
5  AtsFina Research  2.89%  4.27%  3.19% 
6  Heraeus Electro-Nite International  2.98%  2.46%  2.87% 
7  Aventis Crop Science  3.25%  0.49%  2.65% 
8  Innogenetics  2.36%  1.53%  2.18% 
9  Smithkline Beecham Biologicals  1.79%  1.64%  1.76% 
10  U.C.B.  1.75%  1.53%  1.70% 
11  Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products  1.61%  0.00%  1.26% 
12  Staar  1.35%  0.49%  1.17% 
13  Sofitech  0.00%  3.78%  0.82% 
14  International Brachytherapy  0.88%  0.00%  0.69% 
15  Alcatel Bell  0.05%  2.41%  0.56% 
16  Recticel  0.40%  0.38%  0.39% 
17  Norton Performance Plastics  0.50%  0.00%  0.39% 
18  Siemens  0.20%  0.93%  0.36% 
19  Magotteaux International  0.35%  0.11%  0.30% 
20  Sigma  0.27%  0.05%  0.23% 
  Other  3.18%  6.79%  3.96% 
These results are closely related to the findings already presented by Plasmans et al. (1999), 
which are based on the study of the patenting behavior in 22 major industrial sectors of EU core 
countries during the period 1989–1995.  This study indicates that a very limited number of companies   9 
actually accounts for the significantly larger part of patents granted by the EPO.  In our data we 
observe a similar picture: the three companies at the top of the list own 74.46% of all patents issued 
between 1996 and 2000 (inclusive) by the USPTO and the 68.65% of patents issued by the EPO 
during the same period.   
Table 4 shows the aggregated size characteristics of the new economy companies mentioned 
above.  We have obtained weighted consolidated turnover figures for each firm as the sum of the 
firms’ own turnover and the turnovers of their subsidiaries weighted by the total participation share.  
A similar procedure was applied to the average annual employment as well.  These variables serve 
as proxy measures for the firms’ relative size characteristic.  
Table 4.  Profiles of selected firms in Belgium (based on 1998 annual financial 
reports).  Source: Bureau van Dijk 











1  Agfa-Gevaert  1639.490  5702 
2  Solvay  2054.362  3629 
3  Janssen Pharmaceutica  1193.918  3865 
4  Esselte  132.534  572 
5  Atsfina Research  64.413  474 
6  Heraeus Electro-Nite International  75.906  471 
7  Aventis Crop Science  27.172  167 
8  Innogenetics  16.653  380 
9  Smithkline Beecham Biologicals  653.842  1442 
10  U.C.B.  905.245  3693 
11  Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products  106.938  298 
12  Staar  1.257  11 
13  Sofitech  15.301  92 
14  International Brachytherapy  0  8 
15  Alcatel  1110.286  6503 
16  Recticel  261.047  1534 
17  Norton Performance Plastics  18.518  96 
18  Siemens  745.841  3559 
19  Magotteaux International  166.940  740 
20  Sigma  11.987  150 
Among  these  companies,  some  are  quite  big  and  known  (Agfa-Gevaert,  Solvay,  Janssen 
Pharmaceutica, Smithkline Beecham, Alcatel), but also some are much smaller companies (Esselte, 
Staar, Sigma, Norton Performance Plastics).  This indicates that, although the biggest firms occupy 
the top three positions, there are also small companies engaging in the active patenting process.  
Thus, the large  size  of a  company does not necessarily indicate  that it will be more active in 
patenting than its smaller companions. 
                                                            
3 We obtained weighted consolidated turnover figures for each firm as the sum of the firms’ own turnover and the 
turnovers of their subsidiaries in Belgium weighted by the total participation share.  A similar procedure was applied to 
the average annual employment as well.  These variables serve as proxy measures for the firms’ relative size 
characteristic.   10 
From the structure of the ‘citation time lag’ between citing and cited patents, based on the 
data about the time lag between citing and cited patents, we can derive the implications about the 
time structure of knowledge spillovers.  Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of cited patents among 
the different years.  The figure shows that recent patents (relative to the date of the citing patent) are 
more likely to be cited than older ones.  The specifics of the patent examination process actually 
allow  for  the  (small)  negative  citation  lag  values  to  occur  as  one  patent  can  cite  a  published 
application for another patent, which is granted later than the citing patent itself, or when the cited 
patent is reissued. The time structure of the citation lag is very similar in both the USPTO and the 
EPO samples, which serves as additional evidence of compatibility of the data in these two samples 
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Figure 1.  Time lag structure based on the high-tech patents in Belgium, granted 
by two different patent offices during 1996-2000.   
Intra-industry citations.  Let us consider the industrial structure of patent citations indicated in 
data.  Figure 2 presents the ‘surface’ of intra- and inter-industry citations in the patents granted to 
the new economy firms in Belgium.  Each point on the surface represents the percentage of the 
citations between two industry codes in the overall sample.  This surface closely resembles the 
widely used ‘Yale matrix’ (see e.g. Verspagen (1997)).  As we expected, these diagonal elements 
are  quite ‘high’, i.e. there is  evidence  that intra-industry  citations are more numerous than the 
citations between different industries.  The industries presented in the figure were determined from 
the patent’s main IPC, transformed using the IPC-ISIC concordance table (Verspagen et al. (1994)).  
In determining the category of a patent, which indicates several categories in application, we used 
the first category listed.  Table 5 lists all the industries indicated in the ISIC, accompanied by the 
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Figure 2. Relative Frequencies of 1996-2000 Citations High-tech Firms’ Among 
Industries Surface (for industry codes see Table 5). 
The highest peaks correspond to intra-industry citations in ‘Chemistry excluding Pharmacy’, 
‘Instruments’, ‘Pharmacy’.  There are also a number of peaks outside the main diagonal, which 
point at active streams of knowledge flow between certain industries. These flows are primarily 
symmetric  (relatively  strong  in  both  directions  between  two  industries),  but  there  are  several 
asymmetric peaks corresponding to one-directional spillovers, such as between ‘Paper, Printing and 
Publishing’  and  ‘Instruments’.    Among  the  symmetric  cross-industry  knowledge  flows,  the 
strongest ones occur between ‘Chemistry excluding Pharmacy’ and ‘Pharmacy’ industries. 
Using the OECD list of the high-tech industries, we mark the nine corresponding technology 
intensive  industry  classes  in  our  dataset:  Chemistry,  except  pharmacy,  Instruments,  Pharmacy, 
Paper,  printing  and  publishing,  Computers  &  office  machines,  Other  machinery,  Electronics, 
Electric mach., ex. electronics, Motor vehicles.  These nine major high-tech industries account for 
83.73% of all citations considered.   12 
 
Table 5.  Citation Percentages in Different Industries (as a fraction of all 
citations 1996-2000). 
ISIC code  Industry  % of citations 
3510+3520  Chemistry, except pharmacy  23.98 
3850  Instruments  17.84 
3522  Pharmacy  14.75 
3400  Paper, printing and publishing  9.86 
3825  Computers & office machines  7.66 
3820  Other machinery  6.10 
3900  Other industrial products  5.54 
3810  Metal products, ex. Machines  3.57 
3100  Food, beverages, tobacco  2.85 
3832  Electronics  2.80 
3600  Stone, clay and glass products  1.32 
1000  Agriculture  0.89 
5000  Building and construction  0.66 
3830  Electric mach., ex. electronics  0.55 
3710  Ferrous basic metals  0.38 
3530+3540  Oil refining  0.35 
3720  Non ferrous basic metals  0.29 
3300  Wood and furniture  0.20 
3843  Motor vehicles  0.19 
3550+3560  Rubber and plastic products  0.08 
3200  Textiles, clothes, etc.  0.07 
3840  Other transport  0.06 
 
3.  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
In the proposed econometric model we focus our attention on the occurrence of a patent citation 
in a particular industry.  We consider the estimated probability of this event and its relationship with 
a set of independent variables in order to derive analytical implications about the inter- and intra-
industry/firm structure of knowledge spillovers.  Our dependent variable is an indicator, which has 
value 1 if a citation occurs in the patent of a given particular industry, and equals 0 otherwise.  We 
consider the following list of explanatory variables: 
·  an indicator that a patent citation has occurred between patents, owned by the same firm or 
institution (equals 1 if both citing and cited patents belong to the same firm, and equals 0 
otherwise); it is represented by the dummy variable SameFirm; 
·  a ‘concordance weighted’ indicator that a citation has occurred between patents, belonging to 
the same ISIC-industry class (real number between 0 and 1 inclusive);  it is represented by the 
variable SameIndustry; 
·  the year when the citing patent was issued represented by the variable Year; 
·  the value of a citation lag (i.e. the time difference between citing and cited patents, expressed in 
years); it is represented by the variable CitationLag.   13 
We use the concordance percentage from the MERIT Concordance Table (the share of the patents 
in each IPC-class assigned to the corresponding ISIC category, see Verspagen et al. (1994)) to 
weigh the indicator variable for the citation occurred.  If two patents belong to the same industry, 
we calculate the product of their concordance percentages, obtaining in this way the measure of the 
‘citation  occurrence’  in  this  particular  industry.    The  concordance  percentage  is  the  relative 
frequency of patents in the particular IPC class falling into a given ISIC class, thus their product in 
the citation pair represents a certain likelihood measure of the patent citation itself to fall into this 
ISIC class.  Moreover, the usage of concordance percentages leads to the expansion of the modeled 
sample due to the fact that one IPC-class may fall into several industries with different weights. 
It is possible to estimate several specifications of the binary choice model: probit, logit or an 
extreme value distribution, such as a Weibull distribution (see Appendix and also Greene (2000), 
Chapter 19).  In a previous study, which utilized a similar methodology (Lukach and Plasmans 
(2002)), we compared probit, logit and Weibull specifications of the model and also tested it on the 
separate EPO, USPTO and the pooled samples.  We came to the conclusion that using the pooled 
data  is  advisable  and  that  the  Weibull  specification  provides  the  best  goodness  of  fit  
(being more general).  The corresponding slopes or marginal effects (see Appendix) are presented 
in the output tables (Tables 6 – 14). 
Table 6.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Chemistry, excluding Pharmacy’ industry. 
3510+3520  Coefficient  Slope  Std. Err.  Chi-
Square 
Prob. 
Intercept  -79.8305    14.7726  29.2  <.0001 
SameFirm  -0.1794  -0.0611  0.0262  46.83  <.0001 
SameIndustry  0.4228  0.1441  0.0229  341.95  <.0001 
Year  0.0401  0.0137  0.0074  29.42  <.0001 
TimeLag  -0.0079  -0.0027  0.002  15.64  <.0001 
Chemistry, excluding Pharmacy (Table 6).  The results in the ‘Chemistry excl. Pharmacy’ 
industry indicate that there is a statistically significant negative relationship between the SameFirm 
dummy  and  the  probability  of  a  citation.    A  ‘chemical’  patent  is  more  likely  to  cite  a  patent 
belonging to a different firm, rather than its own, i.e. this industry is more oriented towards the 
usage of other firms’ patented knowledge.   
The coefficient for the SameIndustry variable points at a higher likelihood of a citation to occur 
in the same industrial class. This is quite reasonable because of the special nature of the chemical 
industry.  Chemical patents usually protect either molecular structures or technological sequences 
for their synthesis; thus this knowledge stays in the bounds of the own industry.  The positive and 
significant coefficient for the variable Year indicates that the citation is more likely to occur in the 
relatively newer chemical patents.  Concerning the time difference between the citing and cited 
patents, there is clear indication that the probability of citation is higher if the cited patent is more 
recent.  More recent knowledge is more likely to be cited.    14 
 
Table 7.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Instruments’ industry. 
3850  Coefficient  Slope  Std. Err.  Chi-
Square 
Prob. 
Intercept  82.4179    15.7541  27.37  <.0001 
SameFirm  0.0294  0.0085  0.028  1.11  0.2924 
SameIndustry  -0.9939  -0.2890  0.0238  1738.73  <.0001 
Year
  -0.0408  -0.0119  0.0079  26.72  <.0001 
TimeLag
  -0.0026  -0.0008  0.0021  1.58  0.2092 
Instruments (Table 7).  Coefficients corresponding to the time-related variables show that the 
more recent citing patents indicate a smaller number of citations, and that the older patents are more 
likely to be cited by the patents in this industry.  Our data for this industry provide no evidence of 
relationship between the likelihood of patent citation and the fact that the citing and cited patents 
both belong to the same firm, due to the low significance of the coefficient.  But at the same time, 
the Instruments industry strongly favors knowledge spillovers from other industrial sectors.  There 
is no statistically significant indication of a relationship between the probability of citation and the 
lag between the citing and cited patent. 
Table 8.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Pharmacy’ industry. 
3522  Coefficient  Slope  Std. Err.  Chi-
Square 
Prob. 
Intercept  24.1514    14.7865  2.67  0.1024 
SameFirm  -0.2887  -0.0806  0.0255  128.4  <.0001 
SameIndustry
  0.2477  0.0691  0.0257  92.73  <.0001 
Year
  -0.0118  -0.0033  0.0074  2.53  0.112 
TimeLag  -0.0027  -0.0008  0.0021  1.71  0.1907 
Pharmacy  (Table 8).   The ‘Pharmacy’ industry shows a lower  likelihood  of the intra-firm 
citation and a higher probability for knowledge spillovers in the same industry.  Thus, in general we 
expect a knowledge exchange that is more intensive among different firms, but from the same 
industry.  It appears that the more recent pharmaceutical patents indicate fewer citations, although 
the coefficient is moderately significant.  The coefficient for the TimeLag variable is negative, but 
not significant. 
Table 9.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Other Machinery’ industry. 
3820  Coefficient  Slope  Std. Err.  Chi-
Square 
Prob. 
Intercept  -22.4843    16.807  1.79  0.181 
SameFirm  0.2759  0.0367  0.033  69.86  <.0001 
SameIndustry  0.1039  0.0235  0.0267  15.19  <.0001 
Year
  0.0118  0.0063  0.0084  1.96  0.1611 
TimeLag  -0.0165  -0.005  0.0022  55.79  <.0001 
Other Machinery (Table 9).  The title for this industry is ambiguous and makes it difficult 
to  extract  particular  policy  implications,  although  a  significant  number  of  patent  citations  are 
covered by it.   The results  show that in this industry  the time difference between two  patents 
negatively affects the probability of citation.  Regarding the existence of intra-firm spillovers, the   15 
model gives the strong support for this fact.  It also provides strong evidence for a more intra-
industry knowledge exchange.  
Table 10.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Paper, Printing and Publishing’ industry. 
3400  Coefficient  Slope  Std. Err.  Chi-
Square 
Prob. 
Intercept  44.9914    15.1273  8.72  0.0031 
SameFirm  -0.1522  -0.0342  -0.2042  32.96  <.0001 
SameIndustry  0.2181  0.0490  0.1694  76.96  <.0001 
Year  -0.0222  -0.0050  -0.0371  8.44  0.0037 
TimeLag  0.012  0.0027  0.0079  33.47  <.0001 
Paper, Printing and Publishing (Table 10).  This industry exhibits a more inter-firm, but intra-
industry pattern of patent citations.  Newer patents cite less and the older patents are more likely to 
be cited. 
Table 11.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Computers and Office Machines’ 
industry. 
3825  Coefficient  Slope   Std. Err.  Chi-
Square 
Prob. 
Intercept  121.4178    17.1559  50.09  <.0001 
SameFirm  0.3059  0.0563  0.032  91.16  <.0001 
SameIndustry  -0.3387  -0.0624  0.0244  192.59  <.0001 
Year
  -0.0603  -0.0111  0.0086  49.31  <.0001 
TimeLag  0.0144  0.0027  0.0024  36.78  <.0001 
Computers and Office Machines (Table 11).  This industry deserves special attention due to its 
importance in establishing and developing the new economy.  The model was able to produce 
statistically very significant coefficients.  The data strongly advocate for more intra-firm knowledge 
usage rather than inter-firm.  Concerning the inter-industry knowledge spillovers, there is a strong 
support for it, meaning a higher likelihood that the knowledge from other industries will be used.  
The model provides strong support for the positive dependence of the probability of citation on the 
time difference between patents, thus indicating the relatively higher degree of older knowledge 
utilization.  We also see that newer patents are less likely to cite the knowledge from other patent 
documents. 
Table 12.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Electronics’ industry. 
3832  Coefficient  Slope  Std. Err.  Chi-
Square 
Prob. 
Intercept  -27.7583    21.8026  1.62  0.203 
SameFirm  0.4231  0.0333  0.052  66.3  <.0001 
SameIndustry  -0.433  -0.0341  0.0306  200.41  <.0001 
Year  0.0146  0.0011  0.0109  1.79  0.1808 
TimeLag  0.001  0.0001  0.0029  0.12  0.7295 
Electronics  (Table  12).    Similarly  to  the  Computers  industry,  Electronics  tends  to  use 
knowledge  from  other  industries,  but  mainly  from  the  same  firm’s  previous  knowledge  stock.  
There is weak evidence for a positive relationship between the time lag and likelihood of a citation: 
recent patents are cited more, indicating a faster knowledge depreciation in this industry.  The effect 
of the patent’s issue year on citation is left undetermined for the reason of no statistical significance.   16 
Table 13.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Electric Machinery, ex. Electronics’ 
industry. 
3830  Coefficient  Slope  Std. Err.  Chi-
Square  Prob. 
Intercept  -28.9046    31.9358  0.82  0.3654 
SameFirm  0.3867  0.0087  0.1044  13.72  0.0002 
SameIndustry  -0.1521  -0.0034  0.0465  10.71  0.0011 
Year  0.0153  0.0003  0.016  0.92  0.3378 
TimeLag  -0.0041  -0.0001  0.0042  0.98  0.3213 
Electric  Machinery,  ex.  Electronics  (Table  13).    The  industry  of  manufacturing  electric 
machinery  other  than  electronics  stands  in  the  same  line  with  manufacturing  computers  and 
electronics when it comes to utilizing more knowledge from other industries, but drawn from the 
own patent pool.  This observation can be made, although the relative size of the coefficients, 
corresponding to the SameFirm and SameIndustry variables is very small compared to those of 
other industries.   
Table 14.  Weibull regression results in the ‘Motor Vehicles’ industry. 
3843  Coefficient  Slope  Std. Err.  Chi-
Square  Prob. 
Intercept  145.4625    31.9358  0.82  0.3654 
SameFirm  0.3421  0.0019  0.1044  13.72  0.0002 
SameIndustry  -0.2392  -0.0013  0.0465  10.71  0.0011 
Year  -0.0719  -0.0004  0.016  0.92  0.3378 
TimeLag  0.0283  0.0002  0.0042  0.98  0.3213 
Motor Vehicles (Table 14).  The data for this industry show that that the  fact of having two 
patents in a citation pair belonging to the same firm or the same industry, has very small (but 
statistically  significant)  influence  on  the  likelihood  of  a  citation  to  occur.    The  coefficients 
corresponding to the time-related variables fail to show enough significance to let us draw solid 
conclusions. 
3.1. The Intra-Firm/Intra-Industry Positioning Of Industries 
To have a better picture of general results of modeling the knowledge spillovers, we present a 
map of relative positions for particular industries with relation to the likelihood of intra-firm and 
intra-industry citation.  Figure 3 is a two-dimensional graph, where on the horizontal axis we plot 
the slope coefficient for the SameFirm dummy and on the vertical axis is the slope coefficient for 
the SameIndustry variable.  Such an arrangement is based on the interpretation of the obtained slope 
coefficients.  A slope coefficient in our model describes the change in the probability of a patent 
citation at the means of the regressors (see Appendix and Greene (2000), p. 879). 
Thus, a pair of such coefficients for a particular industry points at its unique position on the 
map relative to other industries and the origin, which can be interpreted in the following manner.  
The bottom-left quadrant of the map contains industries, which are more inclined towards inter-firm 
and inter-industry knowledge spillovers (the probability of citation decreases for patents belonging 
to the same firm and industry class).  We can call such industries ‘open’.  The knowledge spillovers   17 
of the vertical type prevail in such industries, indicating the environment very favorable for the 
interdisciplinary cooperation between firms.  On the opposite, the top-right quadrant of the map 
contains more ‘closed’ industries, which favor intra-firm and intra-industry citations (a citation is 
more likely if the patent pair comes from the same industry and is owned by the same owner).  
Spillovers there are very weak and tend to be of the horizontal type.  Firms in such industries are 
expected  to  be  less  inclined  towards  cooperation  with  each  other.  The  bottom-right  quadrant 
combines  a  higher  likelihood  of  inter-industry  vertical,  but  intra-firm  spillovers,  which,  for 
example, can be the case in complex technologies (see Kingston (2001)). And the top-left quadrant 
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 Figure 3. Positioning of the High-Tech Industries with Relation to Intra-firm 
and Intra-industry Knowledge Spillovers (based on the Weibull model). 
On Figure 3 we see that there are no truly ‘open’ high-tech industrial sectors considered in our 
sample.  Moreover, only one industry can be considered as ‘closed’, which is ‘Other Machinery’.  
All other industries are located in the quadrants with the mixed citation patterns on the firm and   18 
industry level.  The ‘Instruments’ industry is in an interesting position, where it is almost indifferent 
between the intra- or inter-firm citation, but it is strongly on the side of inter-industry knowledge 
utilization. Therefore, the vertical spillovers dominate there.  The ‘Computers and Office Machines’ 
industry is open for inter-industry knowledge spillovers, and is less inclined towards using the 
knowledge  of  other  firms.    A  similar  position  has  the  ‘Electronics’  industry.  The  ‘Chemistry, 
excluding Pharmacy’, the ‘Pharmacy’, and the “Paper Printing and Publishing” industry exhibit 
greater openness for inter-firm knowledge spillovers, which preferably do not go far beyond the 
scope of the same industry (horizontal spillovers).  Two other industries, ‘Electric Machinery, ex. 
Electronics’ and ‘Motor Vehicles’, are located very close to the origin of the graph, which does not 
allow us to classify them either open or closed and neither horizontal nor vertical spillovers prevail 
there. 
As we think about the political implications of such analysis, it is recommended to turn to the 
main conclusions of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Lukach and Plasmans (2000).  They 
state that under conditions of stronger horizontal knowledge spillovers, symmetric and asymmetric 
innovative firms have more incentives to engage in R&D cooperation, which results in a larger 
R&D investment and innovative product output.  For a regulator whose goal is to induce R&D 
cooperation,  it  is  important  to  balance  the  market  incentives,  created  by  stronger  knowledge 
spillovers, and the regulatory incentives. 
The  general  guidelines  for  the  regulator,  derived  from  our  study,  can  be  summarized  by 
observing  the  relative  positioning  map  along  the  horizontal  axis.    The  industries  in  the  right 
quadrants  appear  to  be  more  oriented  towards  intra-firm  knowledge  spillovers,  thus  there  are 
rationales for stimulating R&D cooperation among the firms in these industries.  On the other hand, 
the  industries,  situated  in  the  left  quadrants,  operate  under  conditions  of  stronger  knowledge 
spillovers, and there are market incentives, which drive the companies towards more cooperation.  
The regulator in this case can stand on less intrusive positions, observing the ‘natural’ tendencies 
towards cooperation and maybe stimulating only the most interesting joint R&D projects and/or 
alliances. 
Looking at the vertical axis, the regulator, can obtain a clear idea of which kind (intra- or 
interdisciplinary) of alliances is more likely to be created driven by the market incentive, and which 
kind requires additional stimuli.  In the industries with dominating horizontal spillovers (upper 
region of the map) the firms more easily engage in the intra-disciplinary knowledge exchange.  In 
this case the regulator can be interested in promoting more inter-disciplinary cooperation in order to 
broaden the horizons of research in those industries and facilitate introduction of new approaches 
and ideas.  Correspondingly, in the lower region of the map we locate the industries with stronger 
vertical spillovers.  Many new ideas are created there, and the regulator’s task in this case may be to   19 
foster the intra-disciplinary cooperation in order to build up the knowledge base in the industry and 
to strengthen the it’s competitive position. 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this study was to investigate the patenting and patent citation behavior of the 
new economy firms in Belgium using the 1996-2000 patent citation data from the EPO and the 
USPTO.  The attention of this study was concentrated on the patent citations using the (generally 
asymmetric) Weibull binary response variable model.   
A preliminary analysis has indicated that the majority of the patenting is conducted by a (very) 
small number of firms being different in size (represented by the consolidated weighted turnover 
and consolidated weighted average annual employment). The geographical concentration of the 
knowledge is an important but not the crucial feature of the knowledge spillovers through patent 
citations in the Belgium’s new economy firms. 
The  estimated  probability  of  a  patent  citation,  calculated  given  a  particular  set  of  factors 
(SameFirm dummy and SameIndustry variable, time lag between the citing and the cited patents, 
the year in which the citing patent was issued), can be used as an efficient measure of the size of 
knowledge spillovers in a certain industry, and can be applied for various competitive behavioral 
models.   
Once  the  special  feature  of  the  industry  is  determined,  we  obtain  an  understanding  of  the 
knowledge  spillovers  intensity  (likelihood  of  inter-  or  intra-firm  spillovers)  and  character 
(likelihood of vertical or horizontal knowledge exchange).  In particular, analyzing the relative 
positioning  of  different  industries  depending  on  their  attitude  towards  inter-firm  knowledge 
spillovers allows us to infer implications concerning the necessity of measures to stimulate R&D 
cooperation.  We determined the ‘level of openness’ of different industries toward inter-industry 
and  inter-firm  knowledge  exchanges  through  patent  citation.  Industries  with  more  complex 
technologies (such as ‘Computers & Office Machines’, ‘Electronics’ and ‘Instruments’) are more 
open towards inter-industry knowledge flows.  On the other hand the industries with ‘uniform’ 
technological orientation (such as ‘Chemistry, ex. Pharmacy’, ‘Pharmacy’, and ‘Paper, Printing & 
Publishing’) stay more oriented at intra-industry knowledge utilization. In ‘Chemistry’, ‘Pharmacy’ 
we conclude  higher  intensity of inter-firm knowledge exchange, which would indicate  a better 
environment for R&D cooperation.  Firms in the other industries favor more internal knowledge 
flows and have fewer incentives to cooperate in R&D. 
Summarizing these findings, we come up with an argument that public authorities should use 
differentiated measures to regulate R&D activities (and especially R&D cooperation) in the new 
economy by firms in different industries.  The existing knowledge spillovers create certain market-  20 
driven incentives inducing firms to cooperate.  For the firms operating in the high-tech industries 
with conditions of stronger knowledge spillovers, the regulator can adopt a less intrusive policy 
(which  is  usually  a  more  cost  effective  as  well),  observing  the  natural  tendencies  towards 
cooperation and possibly stimulating only the most interesting joint R&D projects and/or alliances. 
The Intra-Firm/Intra-Industry spillovers positioning of industries also allows to determine what 
type of the cooperative research requires more regulators’ support.  In the industries with strong 
horizontal  spillovers,  the  regulator  should  be  interested  in  stimulating  the  interdisciplinary 
cooperative research efforts.  In the industries with strong vertical spillovers, a more stimulus is 
required for promoting the intradisciplinary knowledge exchange and cooperation. 
It is possible for a regulator to use natural market incentives in combination with particular 
regulatory measures to achieve the desired effects in promoting the new economy, whether it is 
higher  R&D  investment  in  high-tech,  improved  diffusion  of  the  state-of-the-art  knowledge,  or 
strengthening the competitive position of the new economy firms facing the foreign competition.   
 
5.  APPENDIX 
The Weibull Binary Choice Model for Patent Citations 
The pooled dataset contains a list of citation pairs, which have already occurred.  Thus, if we 
consider the probability of a citation to occur in patent pairs from our dataset, it is equal to 1. 
Within this population, we select several other sub-events, for example ‘the citation has occurred in 
the citing patent coming from industry A’.  The basic Weibull model can be specified: 
' ' P( 1) ( ) 1 exp( exp( )) i i i y F x x b b = = = - - , 1,2,.., i n = , where n is the number of observations. In 
our case we have: 
1 2 3 4 'i i i i i i x Const SameFirm SameIndustry Year CitationLag b b b b b e = + + + + + . 
The  dependent variable Yi is  an indicator that  the  patent citation  occurred in  the  particular 
industry (see above).  It is also known that the estimated coefficients of a Weibull model (probit and 
logit as well) do not yield the value of the marginal effect of the independent variable.  For the 
Weibull model, the marginal effect for an independent variable is calculated as the product of the 
corresponding equation coefficient and the value of the density function calculated at the means of 
regressors:   
'
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where 
' ' ' ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) exp( exp( )) i i i f x x x b b b = -  is the Weibull density function calculated at the mean of the 
estimated structural part of the model
4.  
Since we have one binary variable in the model, another method for calculating the marginal 
effects should be mentioned.  For a binary independent variable b, the marginal effect (also called 
slope) is calculated as   * * { 1| , 1} { 1| , 0} P Y x b P Y x b = = - = = .  However, Greene ((2000), p. 817) 
indicates  that  ‘simply  taking  the  derivative  with  respect  to  the  binary  variable  as  if  it  were 
continuous provides an approximation that is often surprisingly accurate’.  Thus, we calculate the 
slopes for the binary independent variables in our model in the same way as we do this for non-
binary variables. 
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